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ABSTRACT 
Exploring the link between privacy and behaviour has been 
difficult, as many contextual and other variables lead to a schism 
between privacy attitudes and behaviour. We propose that one 
possible means forward is to consider risk perceptions as an 
important additional dimension when exploring individual 
differences in privacy concern. Using cluster analysis, we 
demonstrate the benefit of creating more multi-dimensional user 
profiles (=clusters) as these can provide a better inside into 
behaviour. These clusters were able to differentiate users based on 
both privacy and risk perceptions into users who were (a) highly 
concerned and risk-sensitive; (b) unconcerned but risk-aware; and 
(c) moderately concerned but less risk-aware cluster. Using these 
clusters, we were able to explain different patterns of self-reported 
behaviours related to technical and general caution. Further 
analysis of behaviours associated with the use of mobile devices, 
public networks and social networking in relation to these clusters 
did not result in any significant findings. We provide a number of 
topics for discussion and practical solutions that have yet to be 
implemented in order to better understand the link between 
privacy attitudes and behaviour.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Underlying the wide ranging discussions on privacy is a general 
agreement that privacy is desirable and beneficial, and in fact we 
have a legally protected right to privacy. Privacy is also a 
commodity that people are prepared to trade, e.g. in order to 
receive personalized recommendations. However, there is little 
agreement on what exactly privacy means. Privacy has been 
defined as “‘the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves, when, how and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others” [26].  Privacy 
can also be considered separate from the public domain, which is 
voluntary and temporary and free from intrusion. The experience 
of privacy provides relief from stressors and opportunities for 
personal development, both of which are crucial to the well-being 
of the individual [20]. However, privacy does not necessarily 
mean complete withdrawal from interaction or refusing to share 
information; rather the “selective control of access” [1; 8]. This 
allows the level of privacy to be optimized in different situations.  
A number of critical issues unite privacy, self-disclosure and 
technology use: lack of knowledge of how information will be 
used, perceived control over that use, trust and vulnerability and 
perceived costs and benefits [14; 19], and how technological 
advances led to loss of reserve [10]. We trade reserve for many 
different things including loyalty points, or to brag about where 
we are. While we are increasingly giving away information we are 
also increasingly losing control of the dissemination of the 
information and have little control over who has access to that 
information.  This is in part facilitated by new devices and the 
federated network of applications that may have access to 
personal data. For this, and other reasons, mobile devices such as 
smartphones are still considered more problematic in terms of the 
privacy they provide when compared to other mobile devices such 
as laptops [4].  
1.1 Linking privacy and behaviour 
Privacy attitudes do not always predict privacy behaviours and 
this can be explained with reference to a variety of research 
studies. We would like to focus on behaviours involving some 
form of security risk, in part because insecure behaviours are 
those most likely to create privacy vulnerabilities. So why are 
privacy preferences and privacy or security behaviours sometimes 
at odds?   
First, privacy perceptions are themselves complex and dynamic – 
showing different kinds of contextual dependency. Six different 
types of privacy have been proposed [21], each outlining an area 
over which people wish to have control over; family intimacy 
friends intimacy, solitude, isolation, anonymity and reserve. This 
suggests that different types of privacy may be relevant in 
different circumstances.  
Second, privacy attitudes may not translate into associated 
behaviours due to a range of other, more pressing personal beliefs 
and (mis)perceptions (e.g., [4; 13]). Beliefs can and do influence 
decisions, but these beliefs may themselves be based upon a 
socially constructed model of what constitutes a security threat 
[17]. In addition, people may not even consider their privacy 
concerns when making certain security decisions [13; 16]. We 
conducted a variety of interviews with users of mobile devices. 
We found that many non-experts are aware of the discrepancy 
between privacy concerns and their actions (manuscript in 
preparation). At the same time, many individuals seemed to be 
unaware of what types of behaviours place them at risk and may 
actually cause or lead to privacy violations. These explanations 
were often based on personal perceived competence (akin to “I 
don’t do that”) and knowledge of risky behavioural choices (like 
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“I recognize dodgy emails”). This means privacy concern may not 
relate or translate into specific behavioural actions because the 
user does not realize that his or her actions are actually in conflict 
with his or her privacy concerns [16].  
Third, individuals may underestimate the consequences of their 
actions – indeed, few realize just how much personally identifying 
and sensitive information they share online (e.g., [16]), potentially 
with strangers when not adapting their personal settings on social 
networks. In addition, they may not realize that games and apps 
accessible via social networks are not vetted for security although 
they appear to be an integral part of the social network which has 
clear privacy settings [15]. 
Fourth, some actions need to be primed. That is, no action may be 
deemed necessary by a user until a significant privacy violation 
occurs. Critical privacy-and security-related events can have a 
behavioural effect on the organization as a whole (in terms of 
changed policies, see example in [5]) or individual behaviour 
[15]. For example, previous experience of privacy violation on 
social networks can predict privacy attitudes [15]. This suggests 
that privacy attitudes within organizations and individuals may be 
subject to critical incidents. Unfortunately, the effect of these 
incidents – in line with the availability heuristic – may be short-
lived. 
1.2 Privacy concern in relation to risk  
We believe that one of the reasons why privacy is not always 
related to behaviour relates to the multi-dimensional nature of 
privacy (see types in [21]) which may not be readily separated 
from perceptions of risk, as these may encourage more active or 
passive reactions on the part of the user in response to heightened 
privacy concerns.   
Several example help explain how both privacy and perceptions 
of risk may relate to each other.  One explanation put forward is 
that perceived risk can have a significant negative on online 
behaviour, even though privacy-active behaviour does not [6]. 
Research results suggest that privacy concerns may be 
differentiated in terms of the extent to which privacy is linked to 
awareness of risks, suspicion about potentials risks being 
involved, and active privacy-promoting behaviours [6]. This again 
proposes a link between privacy concern and risk behaviour.  
Willingness to provide personal information may be in part 
influenced by users’ concerns or fears that this data is misused 
[27]. The framework of online information privacy research by 
[18] also recognizes perceived risks and threats to one’s privacy 
are important elements informing individual’s need for privacy.  
1.3 Research goals 
We wanted to contribute to the better understanding of the 
literature by considering a more multi-dimensional approach to 
how we examine privacy-related behaviours by allowing for 
privacy to be considered in combination with risk perceptions.  
Our research pursued two different goals. In the first instance we 
wanted to generate a more multi-dimensional typology of users 
that rested not just on privacy concern alone, but also incorporate 
other perceptions that link to privacy. This means, rather than 
starting to predict privacy types or concerns, we used user 
perceptions of risk associated to their privacy and data as a 
starting point to differentiate users. Using cluster analysis, we 
created three clusters of users. Each cluster differed significantly 
from each other in terms of their privacy concern, perceived 
vulnerability to risk and severity of risk.  
The next research goal was to examine the utility of creating a 
new typology of users based on perceptions to examine actual 
behaviours. We wanted to find out if these more multi-
dimensional user clusters could help us better understand user 
behaviours in relation to specific behaviours. These behaviours 
included general and technical caution, the selection of secure vs. 
open public wireless network options, use of wireless to access 
social networks.  
2. METHOD 
In the following section, we describe our measures and 
procedures.  
2.1 Measures  
We were interested in assessing the relationship between privacy 
concerns, perceived vulnerability to risk, perceived severity of 
risk, technical and general caution, the use of wireless networks, 
social networks. In order to measure actual behaviours in addition 
to self-report, we also a small decision-making part, where 
participants had to choose one of six public wireless network 
options to connect to across five different screens. This meant that 
the behavioural measures included both self-reported behaviours 
and actual behavioural decisions made by participants. 
2.1.1 Perceptions of risk and privacy concern 
We used three items derived from the original 16-item scale 
introduced by [3] to measure privacy concern. The original scale 
had included questions not statements, each with response options 
on a five-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much” 
(α=.74, =2.40, SD=.93).  Perceived vulnerability to risk was 
measured using four items from [12]. We changed the response 
scales to a five-point scale ranging from “extremely low” to 
“extremely likely” (α=.83, MN=3.05, SD=.72). Perceived severity 
was measured using three items from [12]. We changed the 
response scales to a five-point scale ranging from “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree” (α=.85, MN=4.05, SD=.87). The 
subscales all correlated positively (r>.3, p≤.002).   
2.1.2 Self-reported behaviour 
Technical caution was measured using four items from the 
technical privacy behaviour scale by Buchanan et al (2007). A 
couple of example behaviours were: “Do you check your 
computer for spy ware?” and “Do you remove cookies?” The five-
point response scale ranging from “never” to “always” (α=.67, 
MN=3.16, SD=.79).  General caution was measured using one 
item (“Do you destroy (burn or shred) your personal documents 
when you are disposing of them?”, also by [3] and the same 
response scale (MN=3.21, SD=1.37).   
Additional self-reported behaviours of interest included the 
frequency of public wireless networks and social networking sites. 
The questions were as follows: (a) “How frequently do you 
connect your devices (work iPad, tablet, laptop) to a public 
wireless network?” and (b) “How likely are you to use your 
mobile devices to access social networking sites (e.g., Facebook, 
Twitter, MySpace, Instagrams, LinkedIn, YouTube, etc.)?” The 
response options were identical for both questions: (1) daily, (2) 
weekly, (3) monthly, (4) less than once a month, and (5) never.  
 Table 1: Cluster characteristics 
 
Scales 
Cluster 1  (n=26) 
M (SD) 
Cluster 2 (n=39) 
M (SD) 
Cluster 3 (n=32) 
M (SD) 
Analysis of variance 
Privacy concern 3.37 (.85) 1.76(.59) 2.54(.63) F(2,94)=44.204, p<.001 
Perceived severity of risk 4.63 (.42) 4.23(.60) 3.76(.60) F(2,94)=17.387, p<.001 
Perceived vulnerability to risk 3.72 (.42) 2.58 (.52) 3.30 (.49) F(2,94)=45.83, p<.001 
Note. Nred=97. Post-hoc analysis between the three groups indicated significant group differences across the board for privacy concern (p<.001), 
perceived severity of risk (p≤.018), and perceived vulnerability to risk (p≤.005). These results remained identical if we considered the role of age and 
gender. Cluster labels: 1 = highly concerned and risk-sensitive cluster; 2= unconcerned but risk-aware cluster; 3= moderately concerned but less risk-
aware cluster. 
 
2.1.2 Other behavioural outcomes 
We presented all participants with five different screenshots, each 
featuring six different wireless network options (secure and 
unsecure/open options). This gave us a measure on a restricted 
range (0-5) for the overall frequency with which secure and open 
networks were selected.  
2.2 Procedure 
We recruited 104 social science students to participate in a survey. 
While the questionnaire part involved self-report, the decision-
making task involved a small vignette. All participants were given 
the following scenario: they have an hour to submit some urgent 
work and decide to go to a public café to connect to the Internet. 
In this context, they are presented with various network options. 
Participants were then asked to indicate their first choice from the 
available options on the five screen shots and to explain why they 
had picked specific networks in order to examine which features 
were effective. These explanations suggested that trusted implied 
secure for almost all participants. All images were randomly 
presented to reduce order effects.  
All participants could earn research credits for their respective 
programs. All students could register for the study online. No 
inclusion or exclusion criteria were posited as the recruitment 
sample was believed to be an ideal target audience. All potential 
recruits would be social science rather than computing science 
students (to avoid ceiling effects). In addition, we believed that 
we had a representative sample of wireless network users with 
varying levels of IT proficiency. As we used coloured display, we 
excluded one participant who indicated that he was colour-blind 
(N=104). 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Privacy and risk perceptions  
We decided to examine whether or not our participants fell into 
specific types of clusters of individuals that share different 
degrees of concern about their privacy and risk. We wanted to use 
these clusters as a better means to better interpret privacy 
behaviours (general and technical caution), social networking 
behaviour, and use of public networks via mobile devices.  
In order to determine these groups in the larger dataset (N=104), 
we decided to utilize hierarchical cluster analysis [9]. We used the 
responses we had retained for three subscales (privacy concern, 
perceived severity of risk, and perceived vulnerability). Each of 
these scales featured five response options (frequency for privacy, 
agreement scales for perceived severity and vulnerability to risk).  
We applied a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s (1963) 
linkage method, using the squared Euclidean distance as a 
measure of similarity [25]. The visualization of the clustering 
process in the dendrogram indicated two possible solutions, 
namely two or four groups of classifications. We analysed the 
group sizes of the four-factor solution (n1=26, n2=39, n3=32, and 
n4=7). All analyses of variance involving the three subscale 
composites (for privacy concern, perceived severity and 
vulnerability to risk) indicated significantly different group 
means. However, given that the fourth cluster was so small, we 
used the original four cluster solution to generate a new cluster 
variable – this time excluding all cases that fell into the fourth 
category. This therefore generated a three-category variable in a 
new dataset of 97 cases which we used to examine group 
differences. 
3.2 Description of cluster characteristics 
The clusters can be differentiated as follows (see Table 1 for 
details). The first cluster appeared to have the highest concern for 
their privacy (3.37). This seems to coincide with higher scores on 
the perceived severity of risk (4.63), indicating a much higher 
degree of concern about others having access to their data. This 
group also had a strong sense that they are more likely to be 
vulnerable to risks (3.72). As a result, we labelled this first group 
as the highly concerned and risk-sensitive cluster. 
The second cluster has very low privacy concerns (1.76). They are 
also not feeling particularly vulnerable, that is, they are not as 
concerned about risks affecting them (2.58). They do, however, 
indicate a moderate level of perceived severity of risk (4.23). This 
suggests that they recognize the seriousness of various threats for 
their data. We named this cluster the unconcerned but risk-aware 
cluster.  
The third cluster were moderately concerned about their privacy 
(2.54) and considered themselves somewhat vulnerable to risk 
(3.30). They were not as concerned as the other two clusters about 
potential threats having a serious effect on them. This means, their 
perceived severity of risk was lowest amongst the three groups 
(3.76). Based on these characteristics, this cluster is the 
moderately concerned but less risk-aware cluster. In the next 
step, we wanted to test if we can use our multi-dimensional 
clusters to better understand and interpret security-related 
behaviours. 
3.3 Cluster differences in behaviours 
We were interested in how well our multi-dimensional clusters 
could help explain different behaviours. These were: general and 
technical caution, the selection of secure vs. open public wireless 
network options, use of wireless to access social networks.  
3.3.1 Technical caution (self-reported) 
We first examined technical caution. Using ANOVA (gender and 
age were not significant covariates), we wanted to examine if the 
extent to which our participants engaged in behaviours related to 
technical caution would be different across the three clusters we 
determined. This was indeed the case (F(2,94)=4.025, p=.021, 
partial η2 = .08).  
However, the differences between the clusters seem to be most 
pronounced and between those in cluster 1 (highly concerned and 
risk-sensitive) compared to those in cluster 2 (unconcerned but 
risk-aware) and in relation to cluster 3 (moderately concerned but 
less risk aware). Post-hoc analysis suggested that these group 
comparisons were all statistically significant (p>.05). No 
difference emerged between cluster 2 and 3 (p=ns). Descriptives 
suggest that those who were highly concerned about privacy and 
risk sensitive (cluster 1) also tended to report a greater average of 
behaviours related to technical caution (MN=3.49, SD=.78) than 
those who were unconcerned and risk aware (cluster 2, 
MN=2.99, SD=.71) or moderately concerned but less risk aware 
(cluster 3, MN=2.99, SD=.81). The descriptives are pictured in 
Figure 1. The vertical axis refers to the technical caution (a higher 
scores indicates greater frequency with which individuals 
removed cookies, checked for spyware and similar). 
3.3.2 General caution (self-reported) 
We first examined general caution.  Again, using ANCOVA (age 
was a significant covariates, p=.015), we observed a significant 
differences between the clusters (F(2,87)=3.460, p=.036, partial 
η2 = .07, n=91). A significant difference arose between those in 
cluster 1 (highly concerned and risk-sensitive) compared to those 
in cluster 2 (unconcerned but risk-aware) as indicated in the post-
hoc analysis (p=.031). No other significant group differences 
arose.   
Descriptives suggest that those who were highly concerned about 
privacy and risk sensitive (cluster 1) would more often destroy 
personally identifiable information (MN=3.77, SD=1.21) than 
those who were unconcerned yet risk aware (cluster 2, MN=2.81, 
SD=1.46) or moderately concerned but less risk aware (cluster 3, 
MN=3.16, SD=1.32). The weak but positive correlation with age 
suggested that older participants would be more likely to dispose 
of their documents carefully (r=.262, p=.009). The results for 
technical and general caution are listed next to one another in 
Figure 1. 
3.3.3 Selection of wireless networks 
We also wanted to examine if our clusters could help explain 
which types of open wireless networks our participants selected. 
We did not observe any significant group differences. The 
different clusters did not differ significantly in terms of the extent 
to which they selected fewer or more open networks when 
connecting to public wireless. The same applies to the extent to 
which they selected secure networks.  
 
 
Note. The y-axis refers to the average score obtained in terms of 
technical and general caution. Higher scores indicate that 
participants would more frequently engage in behaviours 
associated with technical and caution. 
3.3.4 Use of social networks and public wireless 
networks (self-reported) 
We observed no significant differences in relation to the 
frequency with which the three clusters accessed social networks 
or public wireless. This indicates that in our sample, decisions 
about social networks and the use of public wireless must be 
driven by other variables – those not immediately related to 
privacy concerns.  
4. DISCUSSION 
The results of our survey can be summarized as follows. The use 
of multiple scales to produce multi-dimensional clusters seemed 
to be useful tool when interpreting behaviours related to technical 
and general caution. The differentiated findings suggest that 
privacy concern, even when moderately high, will not result in the 
same behaviours compared to privacy concern that is also 
combined with great risk concern.   
The different responses of the clusters in terms of general and 
technical caution also link to findings by [13]. These authors 
found very different subgroups, who while concerned about 
personal privacy, also utilized very different decision-making 
strategies. In our case, we see that the combination of concerns 
(privacy and risk) is what drives behaviours. This gives credence 
the benefit of considering multiple user variables when trying to 
analyse behaviour, particularly privacy behaviour.  
Privacy concerns may not predict all behaviours, when these are 
security related (see also [4]). When we considered alternative 
behaviours, the picture quickly became murky. The actual use of 
certain devices or online services seems to be a function of other 
variables not included in our survey. We believe that these 
behaviours may depend on the situation and devices that 
individuals have at their disposal. Previous work suggests that 
Figure 1. Technical and general caution amongst different 
clusters 
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behaviours such as installing new free applications will depend on 
the type of devices the person is using [4]. Smaller mobile devices 
such as smartphones may be used as secondary devices that users 
are also more comfortable using to try out new applications (even 
though such behaviours may be in conflict with their privacy 
concerns).  
This brings us to the limitations of our work. Surveys are best 
suited for attitudinal assessments, rather than behaviours or 
experience [13]. Unfortunately, much of the research on privacy 
and behaviour suffers from the short-coming. Our study is no 
different. The use of self-report (in relation to social networking) 
and insufficient external validity of the network selection task 
may have impacted our results, even though we made sure to use 
Android default screens when presenting the network options. 
These circumstances limit the possible generalizability of our 
findings.  
There is still considerable ambiguity in our understanding of 
privacy within the technology domain, and there has been little 
systematic research exploring privacy aspects related to the 
sharing of location information, preferences, and habits from and 
between supportive/assistive technologies by older adults. We 
hope we made a small contribution by helping to provide a more 
multi-dimensional picture of how user behaviour may be 
influenced by a combination of privacy and risk perceptions.  
5. WORKSHOP QUESTIONS AND 
CONTRIBUTION 
Our results suggest that privacy concerns may be complemented 
by risk perceptions to better understand behavioural outcomes. In 
addition to the methodological contribution, we believe that our 
research experience may be relevant in the discussion of the 
following themes and queries: 
How can we increase user understanding of privacy-related 
risks associated with prevalent and risky behaviours? 
One suggestion is to develop a user-centric security maturity 
model that consider user’s privacy concerns for different parts of 
their data, their knowledge about how their behaviour can 
compromise their privacy. One issue here is that many users may 
not understand, read EULA and process the details in these 
policies (e.g.,[15]). At the same time, purchases are considered 
giving consent to consumer data being used for other purposes, 
even when the consumers will not have formally read nor agreed 
to the privacy policy of the company (see [13]).  
If we can make smoking warning labels easier to understand, why 
is this not being done in IT? We need to redefine what are “fair 
information practices” [11]. Moreover, when online websites 
feature more salient privacy information about how they protect 
the consumer’s data, potential consumers were also more likely to 
pay a premium to purchase products from these sites [24]. This 
demonstrates salience can be beneficial. Further suggestions are 
outlined in [13]  
In addition, it is important to question the idea that digital natives 
will automatically understand technology (see also [16]) and 
employ more than just basic safeguards (e.g., [7]). Some evidence 
actually suggests that the younger users are less concerned about 
privacy threats than younger users of social networks [11]. 
But even if we increase user understanding, any intervention also 
needs to increase user motivation and interest to protect 
themselves and their data more carefully. Recommendations vary, 
ranging from making users take more responsibility (e.g., [7]) or 
removing any responsibility for security from the user. However, 
the latter will only provide some level of security when the system 
can indeed protect against eventuality, which is unlikely given the 
use of mobile devices and policies such as BYOD (bring-your-
own-devices) being adopted in the workplace. A healthy 
combination of both seems more appropriate. 
How do we better consider the context when individuals make 
decisions? 
You may share a password with a partner, to build trust but you 
wouldn't share with anyone else. The sensitivity of personal data, 
such as about one’s health, also influences privacy concern [2]. In 
a similar fashion, so does poor health status [2]. So context is 
important, both in terms of the information and the situation 
individuals face.  
Based on our research and that of previous uses on mobile devices 
[4], we would like to suggest that individuals perform different 
behaviours on their devices depending on their ownership of the 
devices (employer- or privately owned), the function of the 
computers as primary or secondary devices, the role of costs and 
financial incentives. Some behaviour may be perceived as 
representing a greater risk to privacy than others (e.g., banking vs. 
social networking). Another question therefore: To what extent 
then are some behaviour more closely linked to privacy concerns 
than others? Discussing these findings and questions with 
workshop collaborators may help us develop a tool kit to consider 
which variables we need to control for/ evaluate as well when 
examining the privacy-behaviour link.  
To what is the popularity of personalization undermining 
privacy protective motives? 
Personalized websites, computers, user interfaces and applications 
are increasingly popular. Not only do they cater to the needs of 
the person using these technological options, but they may also 
make it easier for them to obtain and structure information. Yet at 
the same time, these personalization options may increase the risk 
that users are no longer fully in control of their data. In addition, 
such personalization may even “amplify and complicate the 
Internet’s inherent privacy risks and concerns” [23], an 
assessment we agree with. Turning back the clock on personalized 
services is unlikely to be successful, but we do need to consider 
the possibility of devices platform and application independent 
cross-functional privacy systems that will detect potential privacy 
risks that may result due to personalization preferences.  
Where do we draw the line between organizational and 
individual privacy practices? Is there a line? 
The discussion of responsibility for appropriate privacy 
behaviours can be attributed to either two parties, or shared 
equally. Evidence suggests that privacy practices are not 
necessarily seen as part parcel of organizational corporate 
responsibility, as a result evidence supporting the 
institutionalization of appropriate evidence is rare [22]. If 
organizations take the lead, will this increase employee/ 
individual awareness of appropriate privacy practices? Starting a 
discussion about the various stakeholders that need to be 
consulted and involved in the development of privacy practices 
may increase awareness for this issue at both organizational and 
individual levels of action. 
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